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[The article below was distributed by the Pacific News Service on 03/20-26/89. The LADB has
authorization from PNS for reproduction.] By Bob Ostertag After a decade of US-backed attempts
to forge a moderate center as an alternative to leftist revolution in this war-ravaged nation, the
March 19 presidential elections have brought the nation back to the stark political polarization that
started the war in the first place. Once again, an extreme right-wing government is facing a marxist
insurgency with little in between. Whatever there had been of a political center represented by
the Christian Democrat party of currency president Jose Napoleon Duarte was summarily pushed
aside. Over half of those who voted (some 1 million in all) did so for Alfredo "Fredy" Cristiani, the
candidate of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), now president-elect. But at least 800,000
registered voters did not vote at all. While the guerrillas of the leftist Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) had called for a boycott of the election after a rebel peace proposal was
rejected, the low voter turnout did not reflect a broad swing of public sentiment to the left. Many
voters stayed away from the polls due to fear or lack of transport, as rebels attacked numerous towns
and brought public transportation to a halt. Nor did the Cristiani vote, estimated at some 500,000,
necessarily reflect a dramatic swing by the populace to the right. The fear and uncertainty have
helped push the rightists over the top, as the highly motivated and organized ARENA supporters
turned out to vote in party-provided transportation while other voters stayed home. Despite the
reputation of ARENA leadership for violent anti-communism, the party's campaign was empty of
ideology, focusing instead on the much more popular issue of the corruption of the ruling Christian
Democrats. Nevertheless, the elections are a political watershed in El Salvador's civil war. The
several thousand cadres of the FMLN and their counterparts in ARENA have virtually cleared
the field of other political players. Both sides will face daunting challenges in the coming weeks.
The FMLN, while paralyzing the country and launching widespread attacks in the early morning
hours of election day, failed to demonstrate a military capability equal to that predicted by their
spokespersons beforehand. Full details of the fighting in more remote areas are unknown, and the
rebel hype prior to election day may have been intended in part to throw the army off balance. But
at least in the politically crucial capital city, the army carried the day. Thousands of troops covered
the city, and the rebels managed only one minor incursion in the working class barrio of San
Ramon. Furthermore, the rebels' political allies in the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of Social
Democratic politicians who participated in the elections, did extremely poorly in the voting. They
failed to pull away from the pack of largely irrelevant, minuscule parties clustered in the single digit
returns. Convergence leaders had complained that the violence and the guerrilla boycott seriously
hampered their campaign, and vainly called on the guerrillas to lift their traffic ban on the day of the
elections. The difficulties confronting ARENA, however, may be even more imposing as they seek
to govern a country where some 70,000 have died in political violence over the last decade. Despite
an economy ravaged by war and sabotage, they will now have to deliver on campaign promises
of expanded public health services, state-backed housing loans and similar programs for virtually
anyone who asks. In fact, analysts agree that the first order of business for the Cristiani government
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after taking power on June 1 will be a sharp devaluation of the national currency. Furthermore,
ARENA is expected to move quickly to "privatize" agricultural cooperatives formed during the
US- designed land reform program nine years ago. This will put the new government on a collision
course with many of the cooperative members. The cooperatives form the backbone of the rural vote
which brought current president Duarte to power five years ago, but drew increasingly away from
the Christian Democrats as the cooperatives fell into financial chaos. Many now see the ARENA
privatization program as a veiled attempt to turn the cooperatives back to their previous owners,
the oligarchs who form the core of ARENA, and have threatened to "take up arms" in response. It
was, after all, the more or less overt rule of the oligarchs in the 1960s and 1970s that led El Salvador
into civil war in the first place. And though they have again placed themselves at the helm of the
government by astutely capitalizing on the mistakes of the Christian Democrats, it is doubtful they
can now end the war they helped start.
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